The recent decision by the Amasaman High Court to reduce the sentence of spiritualist Patricia Asiedu, popularly known as Agradaa, from 15 years to just 12 months has sent shockwaves across Ghana’s legal and public spheres. While appellate courts have the discretion to adjust sentences, this reduction respectfully crosses the line from judicial discretion into the realm of absurdity. Read the full judgment here.
Many Ghanaians are asking: Is this even legal? Technically, yes. Judges have the authority to determine the length of imprisonment within the framework of the law. But legality does not equate to wisdom or justice. The law circumscribes penalties for specific offences for a reason: to deter wrongdoing, uphold public confidence, and maintain the integrity of the justice system.
Agradaa’s conviction was not for a trivial act, and I am convinced respectfully that the judge at the Amasaman High Court missed this point. She was found guilty of defrauding the public—a serious offence classified as a second-degree felony under Section 131 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29). The law is clear under Section 296 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30) that such offences carry a maximum penalty of up to 25 years’ imprisonment. She was also convicted and sentenced for charlatanic advertisement under Section 137 of Act 29, an offence that attracts only a fine. But to reduce her sentence to a single year after upholding her conviction by the trial Court effectively diminishes the severity of the crime and, in effect, recasts a felony as a mere misdemeanour.
“After a thorough examination of the evidence led by the prosecution, I came to the irresistible conclusion that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the Appellant beyond reasonable doubt and that indeed the Appellant on the 7th day of October, 2022 defrauded the two complainants of various sums of moneys. Accordingly, the court below was right in convicting the Appellant of the two counts of defrauding by false pretenses,” here’s the judge, Justice Solomon Oppong-Twumasi, at page 21 of the judgment.
It is no accident that lawmakers clearly distinguished between misdemeanour offences and second-degree felonies. The distinction is not merely semantic or cosmetic; it goes to the heart of punishment and proportionality. Section 296 of Act 30, which governs sentencing, leaves no room for ambiguity, as it deliberately prescribes different sanction regimes for different categories of offences under our criminal law.
At page 31 of the judgement, the judge held that: “The offence of defrauding by false pretenses is regulated by section 131 Criminal and Other Offences Act, 1960, (Act 29). Under the said section, the offence of defrauding by false pretenses is described as a second degree felony and it is generally tried summarily. The section does not provide any minimum punishment for the offence of defrauding by false Pretences; it may however attract a sentence from a fine to a maximum of 25 years imprisonment or both a fine as well as a term of imprisonment. Thus, judges in Ghana have been given a wide room to exercise their discretion when it comes to the imposition of sentences on people who have been convicted for fraud under this section.”
But to hold that a second-degree felony may attract a fine is, respectfully, not a sound appreciation of the nature of the offence in issue and the accompanying punishment regime. The court stated at page 39 of the judgement that, “I agree in principle that the sentence that was imposed was to serve as a deterrent to future offenders, but if care is not taken, then to quote the eminent statesman, President Kuffour, we may be ‘killing a common mosquito with a sledgehammer,’ and in the process, we may become a laughing stock in the comity of nations.”
With the greatest respect, that analogy is wholly inapposite. A 15-year custodial sentence for a serious offence such as defrauding by false pretence cannot reasonably be likened to excessive or disproportionate punishment. On the contrary, reducing such a sentence trivialises the gravity of the offence and poses a real threat to justice and deterrence under our criminal law.
Judicial discretion is a cornerstone of our legal system, but discretion without adherence to legal principles is dangerous. Ghanaian judges must exercise this power with an understanding of the broader social implications of their decisions. Reducing a serious fraud conviction to a one-year sentence sends the wrong message: that the law can be bent, and serious crimes may incur minimal consequences.
The State is not powerless in this regard and must take steps to correct this injustice. Mechanisms exist to ensure that justice is upheld, including the right to appeal or escalate cases when sentences appear disproportionately lenient. The current ruling should serve as a clarion call for the State to act decisively, not only to preserve public confidence but also to uphold the deterrent function of criminal law.
At its core, this decision risks normalising fraudulent behaviour. A sentence of 12 months is insufficient to deter those who would exploit vulnerable citizens for personal gain. It trivialises the suffering of victims and undermines the principle that crime must be met with proportionate punishment.
The broader implication is even more troubling. When the judiciary appears lenient on serious crimes, it weakens the moral authority of the criminal justice system. Citizens may start to question whether the law protects them equally or if powerful individuals can expect leniency.
In this case, the court’s decision has respectfully made a mockery of the law. Second-degree felonies are serious offences with lasting social consequences, and leniency of this scale diminishes the rule of law. It sends a chilling signal to would-be fraudsters and erodes trust in Ghana’s legal institutions.
We must ask ourselves: what kind of justice system allows serious offenders to walk away with almost symbolic punishments? The answer should not be discretion alone but principled discretion—one grounded in law, precedent, and the societal need for deterrence.
The Agradaa case presents an opportunity for reflection and reform. It is a moment for the State, the judiciary, and legal practitioners to reaffirm that justice is not negotiable and that crimes that harm the public must be met with consequences that reflect their severity.
Ultimately, the legitimacy of Ghana’s criminal justice system hinges on consistency, fairness, and accountability. When courts fail to impose proportionate sentences, they erode the very foundations of justice they are meant to uphold.
The Agradaa ruling should be more than a headline. It should be a wake-up call. Discretion in the courts is vital, but discretion without responsibility is dangerous. Ghana must ensure that its justice system protects the innocent, appropriately punishes the guilty, and maintains the public trust that underpins the rule of law.
Updated February 7, 2026
this is powerful 👍
Continue the good work powers
Thank you.