Vote-Buying in Internal Party Elections: Not a Crime, but Perception Is Everything

The outrage that followed events at the Ayawaso East Constituency over the weekend raises an important question: why are Ghanaians so incensed? Is it because such conduct is unprecedented, or because of the sheer scale and brazenness of what allegedly occurred? The uncomfortable truth is this: vote-buying in internal party elections, however reprehensible, is not a crime under Ghanaian law. Yet legality alone cannot resolve the deeper democratic concerns the incident exposes.

Vote-buying—also described as electoral clientelism or patronage politics—refers to the practice whereby a political party or candidate offers money, gifts, or other material benefits to voters in anticipation of an electoral contest, with the expectation that such inducements will influence the voter’s choice in favour of the benefactor.

Vote-buying becomes criminal only when it occurs in a public election. Within the context of an internal party contest, the law does not presently prohibit the giving of gifts or inducements to delegates. This distinction, though legally sound, is often lost in public discourse—and therein lies the problem. The law may excuse the conduct, but public perception does not.

It has been alleged that Ghana’s High Commissioner to Nigeria, Baba Jamal, and his main contender, Hajia Amina Adams, both distributed items to delegates during the contest. These allegations must, of course, be investigated, and conclusions drawn strictly from established facts. Nonetheless, the allegations alone have been sufficient to ignite public anger and revive long-standing concerns about money’s corrosive influence on Ghanaian politics.

It is important to clarify that despite their public-facing nature, political parties are not public institutions in the strict legal sense. They are fundamentally different from constitutional bodies such as the Electoral Commission, the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), or the Office of the Attorney-General. This distinction matters greatly when assessing the applicability of criminal statutes.

Section 256 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), as amended by the Criminal Offences (Amendment) Act, 2020 (Act 1034), criminalises corruption, intimidation, and personation only in respect of public elections. A person who contravenes this provision is liable to a minimum of five years and a maximum of ten years’ imprisonment and is further disqualified from holding public office related to the election.

Similarly, Sections 18, 19, and 20 of the Representation of the People Law, 1992 (PNDCL 284), treat bribery—commonly referred to as vote-buying—as a ground for invalidating election results. Once again, these provisions apply squarely to public elections and do not extend to internal party processes. Some suggest that the Supreme Court has held that political parties are public institutions, indicating that Act 29 and PNDCL 284 apply to vote-buying during internal party elections, but that is wrong. The Supreme Court decision in The Republic v Yebbi & Avalifo has been wrongly interpreted and does not support the conclusion that political parties are public institutions.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Republic v Yebbi & Avalifo does not directly address the institutional status of political parties, and we need to be careful not to lift portions of judgments out of context to support sweeping legal conclusions. We need to draw a clear distinction between the ratio decidendi—the binding principle of a case—and obiter dictum—statements made in passing. This distinction is fundamental to legal reasoning and professional survival in legal practice. Was whether or not political parties are public institutions a question before the Court? The answer is ‘No.’ Therefore, whatever comment the Court makes in passing is obiter, that is, not law.

Crucially, none of these statutes directly regulates conduct during internal party elections. Even more striking is the silence of the Political Parties Act, 2000 (Act 574), which one would reasonably expect to address internal party democracy in clearer terms. The result is a legal vacuum that allows ethically troubling conduct to persist without formal sanction.

That said, political parties are not entirely without constitutional obligation. Article 55(5) of the 1992 Constitution mandates political parties to ensure that their internal organisation conforms to democratic principles and that their actions do not contravene the Constitution or any other law. This provision imposes a moral and constitutional duty on parties to discourage and sanction corrupt practices, even where criminal liability does not arise.

Indeed, although neither the NDC nor the NPP constitutions expressly regulate vote-buying, both provide broad disciplinary frameworks capable of addressing such conduct. Article 40 of the NDC Constitution allows disciplinary action for acts likely to adversely affect the party’s effectiveness, while Article 4 of the NPP Constitution similarly provides for sanctions, subject to the right to be heard. Vote-buying can reasonably fall within these provisions if parties are willing to act decisively.

Equally, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) may properly assume jurisdiction to investigate the allegations of vote-buying arising from the Ayawaso East Constituency contest, given the involvement of politically exposed persons. The two leading contenders are both appointees of the current government, thereby bringing them squarely within the investigative mandate of the OSP under Section 3 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959).

Section 3(1)(b) of Act 959 empowers the Office to investigate and prosecute allegations of corruption and corruption-related offences under the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29), where such offences involve public officers, politically exposed persons, or private individuals connected to the commission of the offence. For the avoidance of doubt, Section 79 of Act 959 defines a politically exposed person as one who “is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function in this country, a foreign country or an international organisation,” including senior political party officials, government officials, judicial officers, and military officers.

Against this legal backdrop, the announcement by the Office of the Special Prosecutor that it has commenced investigations into the incident—including allegations of vote-buying during the NPP’s presidential primaries—is both welcome and legally sound. It signals an important willingness to subject internal party conduct, where it intersects with public office and corruption-related offences, to proper scrutiny under Ghana’s anti-corruption framework.

But the more troubling question, however, is why—despite widespread public condemnation—we have consistently failed to take firm action against vote-buying. The answer lies in collective political culpability. Vote-buying benefits too many actors across the political divide, making genuine reform inconvenient and, therefore, unlikely without sustained public pressure.

If Ghanaians are truly committed to improving the quality of democracy, public outrage must be redirected strategically. Rather than focusing solely on individual actors, citizens should demand legislative action from government and Parliament to close this gap in the law. Until internal party elections are properly regulated, vote-buying will remain legally permissible, ethically troubling, and politically corrosive.

Legality may excuse the act—but perception, legitimacy, and democratic integrity will continue to suffer.

Updated February 11, 2026