The loud calls for the dissolution or investigation of GoldBod over the Bank of Ghana’s reported losses may sound dramatic, but they miss the real issue entirely. This debate has been swallowed by partisanship, noise, and selective outrage. If we are serious about accountability and sound economic policy, then we must first put the facts in their proper perspective.
Let’s be clear from the outset: GoldBod has not incurred losses. The Bank of Ghana has. The operational losses in question arose from transactions linked to the Gold-for-Reserves (G4R) Programme, where the Bank of Ghana interacts with GoldBod as an intermediary. Conflating the two only muddies the waters and distracts from the real structural problem.
That said, GoldBod has not helped its own case. Public confidence has been shaken by a series of inconsistent explanations from its leadership. The story has shifted uncomfortably—from an outright denial of any losses, to an admission of a GHS2.4 billion (about US$214 million) loss suffered by the Bank of Ghana, and finally to the claim that GoldBod was never designed to make a profit. These moving goalposts naturally raise eyebrows.
On this issue, the clearest and most credible account comes not from hurried local explanations, but from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). According to the IMF, losses under the artisanal and small-scale doré gold transactions component of the G4R Programme reached US$214 million by end-Q3 2025, largely due to trading losses and GoldBod off-takers’ fees. This is not speculation; it is independently verified data.
Understanding how these losses occur is crucial. The Bank of Ghana works with GoldBod through two main channels. In one, the BoG mobilises cedi liquidity from commercial banks, channels it to GoldBod to buy gold from small-scale miners, exports the gold, and then returns the dollar proceeds to the banking system. In the other, the BoG uses high-powered money to buy gold directly from GoldBod, either to build reserves or to refine and add to Ghana’s gold holdings.
The problem is not mysterious—it is mathematical. Ghana does not sell gold at full international spot prices. Gold doré is sold at a discount to cover refining, assay risks, transport, and financing costs. Historically, this discount ranges between 3% and 5%. In October 2025 alone, while the global gold price averaged about US$4,054 per ounce, Ghana realised roughly US$3,919 per ounce—a shortfall of about US$135 per ounce.
Now combine that discount with GoldBod’s 0.5% ad valorem service fee, and an assay fee of about 0.258%, and the outcome is predictable. When gold is purchased at or near spot prices and sold internationally at a discount, losses for the Bank of Ghana are inevitable. This defeats the original economic logic of the GoldBod model.
What makes the situation more troubling are policy inconsistencies. Before GoldBod became operational, its leadership publicly acknowledged that gold is always bought at a discount and that the discount must be fair. Today, the narrative appears to be that GoldBod was never meant to make a profit. Both positions cannot simultaneously be true. Consistency matters—especially when public money and public trust are involved.
Buying gold at a premium and selling it at a discount is simply unsustainable. The unavoidable question, then, is: who absorbs the loss? The answer is the Bank of Ghana. Unless this is a deliberate fiscal or monetary policy choice, the BoG must urgently revise its operating framework. Alternatively, the Ministry of Finance must be honest enough to explicitly absorb these losses instead of pretending they do not exist.
This is why I place greater confidence in IMF data than in politically convenient local narratives. The IMF and World Bank rely on verified domestic and international data sources. In an environment where facts are often contested, independently validated figures are not just useful—they are essential.
There is no need for theatrical investigations or populist calls to scrap GoldBod. The causes of the losses are structural and already evident. What is required is a sober revision of GoldBod’s operating model to prevent recurring losses to the Bank of Ghana.
Beyond the numbers, there are broader concerns. GoldBod’s environmental and traceability systems are not yet fully mature, raising legitimate fears that gold from illegal mining could be entering the supply chain. In a country already scarred by environmental destruction, this is not a trivial issue.
Finally, let us be honest: GoldBod does not generate foreign exchange—miners do. GoldBod merely intermediates the flow of funds to the Bank of Ghana instead of commercial banks. Grand claims of economic salvation at this early stage are therefore premature.
What Ghana needs now is not denial, spin, or economic messianism, but humility, consistency, and transparency. We have seen bold promises before. History teaches us that credibility is built by sound policy, not rhetoric—and once credibility is lost, institutions suffer far more than balance sheets.
A very good read
Incredible job 👏