Public discourse in Ghana has increasingly framed the possible extradition of former Finance Minister Ken Ofori-Atta as a foregone conclusion. That framing is misleading. Extradition is not a political slogan or an executive command; it is a tightly regulated legal process governed by international law, domestic statutes, judicial oversight, and diplomatic restraint. Any serious conversation on the subject must begin—and end—with this reality.
To be clear, Ghana does have a valid extradition framework with the United States. This framework is anchored in the continued application of the 1931 Extradition Treaty between the United States and Great Britain and its dominions. The legal status of that Treaty in Ghana is no longer in dispute. As far back as 1974, a Full Bench of the Court of Appeal in Republic v Director of Prisons; Ex parte Allotey (No. 3) affirmed its applicability. More recently, in Republic v Abiola Ayorinde Kayode & Others (2024), the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Treaty remains part of Ghana’s existing law, expressly preserved by the Extradition Act, 1960 (Act 22), and recognised under Article 11 of the 1992 Constitution.
But the existence of a treaty merely opens the door—it does not compel extradition. Treaties facilitate requests; they do not guarantee outcomes.
Extradition, in its strict sense, is the formal process by which a requesting state seeks the surrender of a person accused or convicted of an offence from a requested state for purposes of trial or punishment. While Ghana’s reliance on a colonial-era treaty may appear unusual, it is not unique. The Nigerian Supreme Court adopted a similar position in Attorney-General of the Federation v Princewill Ugonna Anuebunwa (2022)—a decision approvingly cited by Ghana’s Supreme Court. Continuity of treaty obligations is a settled principle of international law.
Extradition is one of the most circumscribed areas of international cooperation. It is governed by entrenched principles such as dual criminality, the rule of specialty, protection against political persecution, the political offence exception, safeguards against unfair trial, double jeopardy (ne bis in idem), non-discrimination, and—in some jurisdictions—the non-extradition of nationals. These are not technical footnotes; they are substantive barriers designed to prevent abuse of the process.
Procedurally, extradition is anything but mechanical. It begins with a formal request through diplomatic channels, supported by detailed legal documentation. This is followed by executive and administrative review in the requested state. A judicial hearing then determines whether the legal thresholds for extradition have been met, allowing the fugitive to contest identity, dual criminality, treaty applicability, and evidentiary sufficiency. Decisions may thereafter be subjected to appeals or judicial review.
Against this legal backdrop, it is misleading to suggest that extraditing Ken Ofori-Atta would be straightforward. On the contrary, it would be exceptionally complex. This is a high-profile case involving a former Finance Minister and a central figure in a previous administration. In the United States, such a case would attract intense scrutiny—not only from the courts, but also from the executive branch—on issues of prosecutorial fairness, political neutrality, and motive.
This is where Ghana’s own conduct becomes critically relevant. Persistent and prejudicial public commentaries by the Attorney-General and the Special Prosecutor risk doing real damage to Ghana’s credibility as a requesting state. Extradition authorities in the United States take seriously any indication that a request is politically motivated or that the individual has been publicly pre-judged. Loose public statements may play well domestically, but they weaken the legal case internationally.
In the United States, the process is even more layered. A federal magistrate or district judge first determines whether extradition is lawful under the treaty and U.S. statutes. If certified, the matter moves to the U.S. Secretary of State, who retains final discretion under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3186 and 3188. At that stage, legal compliance alone is insufficient. The Secretary may consider humanitarian concerns, foreign policy implications, and U.S. obligations under instruments such as the Convention Against Torture, pursuant to 22 C.F.R. § 95.1. Written representations from the fugitive and other interested parties may also be weighed.
In sum, while a legal basis exists for extradition between Ghana and the United States, successfully extraditing Ken Ofori-Atta would require overcoming significant legal, procedural, and political hurdles. The process is neither inevitable nor automatic. It is a delicate interplay of law, diplomacy, judicial restraint, and executive discretion—made even more fragile by the public posture of Ghanaian prosecutorial authorities.
If Ghana is serious about pursuing extradition, it must abandon the politics of spectacle and return to the discipline of law. In extradition, credibility is currency—and once spent recklessly, it is difficult to restore.
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